With the existence of the American empire already accepted, these ideas tend to concern what the imperial power is used for, and perhaps what it should be used for, or what kind of motivation that drives the imperial policies. The most idealistic way to observe the imperial project is through the scope of Wilsonianism; that it is the duty of the United States to bring peace and democracy to every nation on earth, and that this is inherently a good thing. Critics of this believe that the Wilsonian ideals are a mere pretext for carrying out other, more self-serving, agendas. These critics might include, though perhaps not exclusively, the anti-imperialists and isolationists. However, these critics are not without critics themselves.
Andrew Bacevich argues that isolationism is now seen as something akin to policies of appeasement and weakness, which in turn leads to all sorts of problems. This means that the very idea of isolationism has become all but indefensible. He believes that those who seek to expand and project American power on the world have carefully and very consciously fostered this notion. Max Boot attempts to bridge the gap between isolationism and interventionism, but seems ultimately to opt for the latter. While realizing that American involvement (i.e. interventions of various sorts) has not always produced equally good results, he emphasises that on numerous occasions, the United States has managed to build better infrastructure, provide better security and governance than locals had previously been able to. More importantly, according to Boot, the United States has always intervened with the best intentions.
Another prevailing idea, somewhat related to the ideals of Wilsonianism, is the humanitarian aspect of imperial power. Some, like Michael Ignatieff, argue very much in favour of using imperial power for humanitarian interventions and similar endeavours. This is also a highly idealistic conception of using imperialism, but it is perhaps a bit more pragmatic and realistic than pure Wilsonianism. In this vein, Ignatieff argues that some problems, humanitarian or otherwise, can only be solved by applying imperial power. However, he goes on to subscribe to a semi-Wilsonian notion of how empire can also be a necessary precondition for democracy in countries that are presently undemocratic. This complicates matters greatly, since it blurs the line somewhat between humanitarian intervention and Wilsonian intervention, so to speak. This begs the question of whether or not we consider the two interdependent rather than mutually exclusive. It would then be possible to see one as simply a natural extension of the other. This opens up even more questions over definitions, exposing deep problems with the marriage of imperialism and humanitarianism. Ignatieff sees the humanitarian potential as a case for ‘temporary empire’, thereby affirming that he does not support imperialism outright. On paper, this humanitarian aspect of imperialism looks very reasonable, but as we have seen, it can be difficult to determine the boundaries of a humanitarian mandate. Boot uses an example of a ‘small war’ gone wrong, to illustrate what he believes has become endemic for American interventions; that of getting involved with the best intentions of bringing peace, but end up getting drawn into a conflict. This is yet another slippery slope of interventions, humanitarian or otherwise, in that it is difficult to predict outcome as well as the course of an intervention.
A common complaint about the American empire and its military operations abroad, is that it does not primarily serve any of these aforementioned humanitarian or indeed Wilsonian principles. Rather, a host of critics, for instance Noam Chomsky, insist that overseas interventions and military presence is primarily conducted to protect and promote American commercial interests. As something of a proponent of American empire, Boot goes to great lengths to emphasise that the United States does not intervene or occupy territory solely for economic reasons, showing how American economic interests in, for instance, the Caribbean and Central American nations, is fairly limited. Countering Boot’s argument, Bacevich theorizes that the entire American foreign policy in recent years has been based on what he refers to as ‘openness’, that is, the constant search for access to new external markets. This search for markets, he claims, is basically driven by domestic political struggles within the United States itself. Ensuring the unhindered and constant economic growth for the American people is the all-important objective to gain leverage in this struggle. However, Bacevich does not believe that this economically driven foreign policy qualifies as imperialism in the classic sense, but that it is also rooted in the realization that trade is a better way to ensure global peace, than military conquest might be. Seen in this light, an American empire does not look too bad, but Bacevich makes an important note; that since the United States is primarily concerned with markets and threats to the stability and access to markets, it is very selective in when and where it intervenes. This means that intervention might only be conducted if market stability and access is at stake, not necessarily in any humanitarian crisis that presents itself. This means, as he also notes, that the high rhetoric of Wilsonianism amounts very little in the way of action, and essentially makes Ignatieff’s hope of an empire to take care of the world’s humanitarian problems look very doubtful indeed.
It is however difficult to be too critical of the United States in this regard. For sure, it appears the foreign policy is motivated by self-interest rather than high ideals, but it is difficult to see who else would be able to take on the job as global police force. As Robert Kagan eloquently notes, although for slightly different purposes, Europe has essentially been free riding for a number of years, counting on American defence spending to ensure security. In this light, while maybe not normatively satisfactory, it would at least make some pragmatic sense that the Americans would want some return for their extensive military spending and involvement abroad. Niall Ferguson sees the opportunity in this, of what he calls liberal imperialism. This kind of imperialism entails the free flow of goods, capital, labour and so on, and requires a reasonable degree of international order and peace in order to fully function. Therefore, Ferguson believes that this sort of liberal American empire is perfectly suited to ensure benefits for all people, not only Americans.
So to sum up, there are many ways, in theory at least, in which the American empire might prove to be constructively good, such as for conducting humanitarian operations as well as for providing global peace and prosperity. On the other hand, the very nature of an empire means that the empire is able to impose its will on many other nations; an ability that is easy to exploit and difficult to counter. This also means that even if the empire is acting in a manner of blatant self-interest, it is difficult to hold it accountable.
In the next post, I will look closer at the more military aspects of the American global presence and how the role as the only superpower in the world is retained.
Works referred to here:
Andrew Bacevich: American Empire
Max Boot: The Savage Wars of Peace
Noam Chomsky: Hegemony or Survival
Niall Ferguson: Colossus
Michael Ignatieff: Empire Lite
Robert Kagan: Power and Weakness
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