N+1

There is more than one way of maintaining world supremacy; or hegemony as it is often called, and the American empire seems to be pursuing at least two avenues. One is the insistence of keeping a military far greater and more capable than any potential rivals. The other is making sure that the power and influence of these rivals is kept at a manageable level.

The first avenue involves what Andrew Bacevich calls the ‘N+1 rule’; that the power of the American military should ideally be greater than the combined military power of every other nation in the world. In theory, this means that the United States would win any war, even if the entire world were to join forces in opposition. This, Bacevich argues, was one of the prevailing ideas following the end of the Cold War, with the sudden military supremacy offered by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even if the American military has not yet achieved that ideal level of power, it certainly helps us understand the constantly growing defence budget of the United States, at least if one buys into this argument. The second avenue involves a slightly more pragmatic approach, in that it affects, and perhaps even directs, American foreign policy towards other nations, as well as distribution of troops and bases. In order to keep rivals in check, it is seemingly necessary to have a large number of bases and an even greater number of troops stationed overseas.
However, just because we can distinguish between these two approaches doesn’t mean that they are mutually exclusive. Rather, there seems to be innate connections between the two. For instance, when Zbigniew Brzezinski argues fervently in favour of exerting American influence, meaning military presence or military support for local regimes, in Central Asia, he does so based on a notion that it should ultimately serve American interests. This is done not only by creating access to areas rich in resources, but also by providing stability and denying access to the main rivals Russia and China. In this example, it is clear that the two objectives support each other. Resources such as oil play a huge role in maintaining American military power, and indeed in maintaining America itself. Securing this resource for own consumption, while denying it to a rival is the perfect example of uniting the two approaches.

Brzezinski notes that hegemony is by no means a new concept, but that the United States represents an entirely new form of it. In part because of the unparalleled technological prowess and reach of American military might, and he is not alone in holding this perspective. Noam Chomsky acknowledges the reality of this hegemony, but is less than enthusiastic about what he perceives to be a dangerous and unprecedented American monopoly of force. Chomsky’s concerns are mainly focused on the relatively recent introduction of the concept of preventive war in the name of national security, since it essentially sanctions military intervention anywhere. The concept of preventive war, combined with the global American military supremacy should therefore be cause for immense concern, Chomsky believes. It is again this vast gap in military power, which basically allows the United States to regulate the degree of its own hegemony: the relationship with Europe being a good example. As mentioned here last week, Robert Kagan wants European nations to stop relying on the United States for security, and take on more defensive responsibilities (and expenses) themselves. However, Brzezinski notes that it might require the United States to make certain concessions to the European part of NATO, in order to serve American interests in the long term. This might seem counterproductive in regards to maintaining the hegemonic status, but as Niall Ferguson argues; even a united Europe is not likely to become a strategic threat to the United States anytime soon anyway. So by letting friendly, and non-threatening nations alleviate or allow for redistribution of American military expenses, it might ultimately serve American hegemony to delegate power.

This leads us to the issue of the numerous American military bases and American troop presence. Critics, such as Chalmers Johnson, see the vast distribution of bases around the world as superfluous and without real military or strategic importance. He adds that while many of these bases were originally constructed for Cold War purposes, the military does not want to abandon these bases even though the Cold War is long since over and the Soviet threat has ceased to exist. Rather, he believes, new objectives and purposes for the bases are invented. Additionally, new bases are being constructed that are far larger than they need to be, and Johnson sharply criticizes what he sees as unnecessary expenses for seemingly clandestine purposes. Finding new purposes for old bases suits Chomsky’s argument that a fair share of these bases have now shifted towards supporting operations in the Persian Gulf region. More specifically to ensure the access or control over vital oil supplies. Indeed, this concern over resources extends to Central Asia as well, as Brzezinski predicted it would, and should, writing in 1997. The United States now has bases in Afghanistan and in other areas of this resource rich region. Looking back at Chomsky’s concern over the preventive war doctrine, it is clear that not only does this mean potential intervention anywhere; it also provides a pretext to maintain existing bases or set up new ones, since any base might be needed for a potential intervention. Bacevich notes how trade has come to fall under the umbrella of national security, so it is now possible to imagine how maintaining access to resources, being a national security concern, becomes crucial for maintaining hegemony itself.

The conclusion is quite similar to that of last week’s post. While it is perhaps not welcomed, it is certainly understandable that the United States finds it difficult to simply disarm and give up their influence and power. However, American military dominance still has the potential to do good things, by guaranteeing world peace and stability in the form of Niall Ferguson’s liberal imperialism. On the other hand, it also means that it is all but impossible to reverse the balance of power away from the United States. Unless the empire decides to scale down its power on its own accord, or more dramatically, if it were to crumble.

Next week, in the final post of this series, we will look at how the future might play out for the American empire, with emphasis on the many predictions about its potential fall.


Works referred to here:

Andrew Bacevich: American Empire
Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard
Noam Chomsky: Hegemony or Survival
Niall Ferguson: Colossus
Chalmers Johnson: The Sorrows of Empire
Robert Kagan: Power and Weakness