The End

There is no shortage of predictions about the future of the American empire, in particular in regards to its possible downfall. It is therefore possible to identify several key features of the American empire that makes it particularly liable to eventually decline. First of all, there is what Niall Ferguson describes as a historical truism: that empires rise an fall, almost as part of an automatic historical cycle. This argument is of course well known, and may be considered strong, since every empire in history has eventually lost dominance in one way or another, and therefore it may seem inevitable that the same fate might befall the current American empire. However, given the rather unique nature of the American empire; in terms of the scope of power, global influence, as well as the reluctance for conquering territory, it is perhaps not unthinkable that the American empire might also prove unique in staying power as well. While historcal truisms might be a reliable source of support for predictions, it only takes one exception to disprove a rule.

Though it is of course tricky to predict the future, this has not stopped various scholars and experts from making guesses and qualified predictions. Looking at the more dire predictions first, there are several arguments that speak in favour of a more or less inevitable collapse of the American empire in its current form. Chalmers Johnson describes four ‘sorrows’ that are likely to impact the United States if the current policies and political course are maintained: perpetual war will make the United States less safe, democracy will erode, militarist sentiment will increase and military overspending will cause national bankruptcy. These are all interesting, but the most tangible are perhaps those concerns regarding the dangers of perpetual war as well as the risks of bankruptcy.

Both Johnson and Noam Chomsky are concerned that seeking continued hegemony might actually be counterproductive in terms of security for the United States. In particular, the two are worried over the implications that the planned Ballistic Missile Defence will have. While the name implies a defensive system, neither are fooled by what they perceive to be a potential offensive weapon; one that in theory ensures the invulnerability of the United States, but might have adverse effects both before and after it is built. Chomsky sees this missile shield, in conjunction with increased weaponization of space, as a potential trigger for a new arms race, which would put not only America at risk, but also the whole world. So as to leave little doubt about how serious he is, Chomsky sees the situation as nothing less than the choice between continued hegemony, or the survival of the human race. Perhaps slightly less dramatic, Johnson sees continued American dominance as a catalyst for smaller countries, seeking to protect themselves from American power, to acquire increasingly dangerous weapons. This would also trigger a new global arms race, with perhaps equally concerning results.

With regards to the economic factors, there are several more conflicting predictions. As mentioned, Johnson sees bankruptcy as a real possible consequence of extravagant and ever-increasing military spending. Even a proponent of the American empire, Max Boot, recognizes that in spite of the vast wealth of the United States, even it has its limits with regards to military capability. Even with the very low percentage of GDP allocated to defence spending, he sees perpetual war as an unsustainable endeavour. For this reason, he believes that the military way is not the only way. However, Ferguson sees things rather differently; it is not military spending that is causing financial problems for the United States, he argues, but rather domestic factors, such as unbalanced national finances and increasing debt. Though it is easy to make connections between the cost of the war in Iraq and the current economic crisis in the United States, defence spending remains negligible, and is therefore not to blame, he claims. If the United States manages to get its domestic finances in order, there should therefore be nothing to stand in the way of maintaining a strong military.

Despite some fairly gloomy predictions, there does seem to be potential for continued American world hegemony, and for the continued existence of the American empire. If some of the concerns from above are heeded, it is not impossible to imagine a combination of initiatives that would at least postpone the fall of the empire. Andrew Bacevich believes that such a re-evaluation of the empire, involving a clarification of objectives and a balancing of means and ends, is necessary to ensure that the American empire does not collapse. This prompts us to look back at last week, and the idea of the ‘N+1-rule’. It is perhaps possible to imagine an American military force that does not pursue this ideal (im)balance of power. Even without being able to take on the rest of the world at once, the American empire is not likely to be challenged anytime soon. Scaling down military spending would not only reduce the risk of counterproductive reactions, as with the Ballistic Missile Defence, it would also provide economic benefits, even if military spending is as negligible as Ferguson and Boot claim. It might also bring on the general re-evaluation that Bacevich wants, and make America realize that ensuring global peace and prosperity might not necessarily involve missile defences or hundreds of overseas bases.


Sources referred to here:

Andrew Bacevich: American Empire
Max Boot: The Savage Wars of Peace
Noam Chomsky: Hegemony or Survival
Niall Ferguson: Colossus
Chalmers Johnson: The Sorrows of Empire

N+1

There is more than one way of maintaining world supremacy; or hegemony as it is often called, and the American empire seems to be pursuing at least two avenues. One is the insistence of keeping a military far greater and more capable than any potential rivals. The other is making sure that the power and influence of these rivals is kept at a manageable level.

The first avenue involves what Andrew Bacevich calls the ‘N+1 rule’; that the power of the American military should ideally be greater than the combined military power of every other nation in the world. In theory, this means that the United States would win any war, even if the entire world were to join forces in opposition. This, Bacevich argues, was one of the prevailing ideas following the end of the Cold War, with the sudden military supremacy offered by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even if the American military has not yet achieved that ideal level of power, it certainly helps us understand the constantly growing defence budget of the United States, at least if one buys into this argument. The second avenue involves a slightly more pragmatic approach, in that it affects, and perhaps even directs, American foreign policy towards other nations, as well as distribution of troops and bases. In order to keep rivals in check, it is seemingly necessary to have a large number of bases and an even greater number of troops stationed overseas.
However, just because we can distinguish between these two approaches doesn’t mean that they are mutually exclusive. Rather, there seems to be innate connections between the two. For instance, when Zbigniew Brzezinski argues fervently in favour of exerting American influence, meaning military presence or military support for local regimes, in Central Asia, he does so based on a notion that it should ultimately serve American interests. This is done not only by creating access to areas rich in resources, but also by providing stability and denying access to the main rivals Russia and China. In this example, it is clear that the two objectives support each other. Resources such as oil play a huge role in maintaining American military power, and indeed in maintaining America itself. Securing this resource for own consumption, while denying it to a rival is the perfect example of uniting the two approaches.

Brzezinski notes that hegemony is by no means a new concept, but that the United States represents an entirely new form of it. In part because of the unparalleled technological prowess and reach of American military might, and he is not alone in holding this perspective. Noam Chomsky acknowledges the reality of this hegemony, but is less than enthusiastic about what he perceives to be a dangerous and unprecedented American monopoly of force. Chomsky’s concerns are mainly focused on the relatively recent introduction of the concept of preventive war in the name of national security, since it essentially sanctions military intervention anywhere. The concept of preventive war, combined with the global American military supremacy should therefore be cause for immense concern, Chomsky believes. It is again this vast gap in military power, which basically allows the United States to regulate the degree of its own hegemony: the relationship with Europe being a good example. As mentioned here last week, Robert Kagan wants European nations to stop relying on the United States for security, and take on more defensive responsibilities (and expenses) themselves. However, Brzezinski notes that it might require the United States to make certain concessions to the European part of NATO, in order to serve American interests in the long term. This might seem counterproductive in regards to maintaining the hegemonic status, but as Niall Ferguson argues; even a united Europe is not likely to become a strategic threat to the United States anytime soon anyway. So by letting friendly, and non-threatening nations alleviate or allow for redistribution of American military expenses, it might ultimately serve American hegemony to delegate power.

This leads us to the issue of the numerous American military bases and American troop presence. Critics, such as Chalmers Johnson, see the vast distribution of bases around the world as superfluous and without real military or strategic importance. He adds that while many of these bases were originally constructed for Cold War purposes, the military does not want to abandon these bases even though the Cold War is long since over and the Soviet threat has ceased to exist. Rather, he believes, new objectives and purposes for the bases are invented. Additionally, new bases are being constructed that are far larger than they need to be, and Johnson sharply criticizes what he sees as unnecessary expenses for seemingly clandestine purposes. Finding new purposes for old bases suits Chomsky’s argument that a fair share of these bases have now shifted towards supporting operations in the Persian Gulf region. More specifically to ensure the access or control over vital oil supplies. Indeed, this concern over resources extends to Central Asia as well, as Brzezinski predicted it would, and should, writing in 1997. The United States now has bases in Afghanistan and in other areas of this resource rich region. Looking back at Chomsky’s concern over the preventive war doctrine, it is clear that not only does this mean potential intervention anywhere; it also provides a pretext to maintain existing bases or set up new ones, since any base might be needed for a potential intervention. Bacevich notes how trade has come to fall under the umbrella of national security, so it is now possible to imagine how maintaining access to resources, being a national security concern, becomes crucial for maintaining hegemony itself.

The conclusion is quite similar to that of last week’s post. While it is perhaps not welcomed, it is certainly understandable that the United States finds it difficult to simply disarm and give up their influence and power. However, American military dominance still has the potential to do good things, by guaranteeing world peace and stability in the form of Niall Ferguson’s liberal imperialism. On the other hand, it also means that it is all but impossible to reverse the balance of power away from the United States. Unless the empire decides to scale down its power on its own accord, or more dramatically, if it were to crumble.

Next week, in the final post of this series, we will look at how the future might play out for the American empire, with emphasis on the many predictions about its potential fall.


Works referred to here:

Andrew Bacevich: American Empire
Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Grand Chessboard
Noam Chomsky: Hegemony or Survival
Niall Ferguson: Colossus
Chalmers Johnson: The Sorrows of Empire
Robert Kagan: Power and Weakness

Imperial Motives

Following our conclusions from last week, we can now look at a question that is rather difficult to answer: whether the American empire is the ultimate force for good, or just plain bad. Naturally, this is the subject of fierce debate, and while it is impossible to make a comprehensive picture of the entire debate here, we can at least observe the outline of some of the most prevailing ideas, and draw important conclusions from them.

With the existence of the American empire already accepted, these ideas tend to concern what the imperial power is used for, and perhaps what it should be used for, or what kind of motivation that drives the imperial policies. The most idealistic way to observe the imperial project is through the scope of Wilsonianism; that it is the duty of the United States to bring peace and democracy to every nation on earth, and that this is inherently a good thing. Critics of this believe that the Wilsonian ideals are a mere pretext for carrying out other, more self-serving, agendas. These critics might include, though perhaps not exclusively, the anti-imperialists and isolationists. However, these critics are not without critics themselves.
Andrew Bacevich argues that isolationism is now seen as something akin to policies of appeasement and weakness, which in turn leads to all sorts of problems. This means that the very idea of isolationism has become all but indefensible. He believes that those who seek to expand and project American power on the world have carefully and very consciously fostered this notion. Max Boot attempts to bridge the gap between isolationism and interventionism, but seems ultimately to opt for the latter. While realizing that American involvement (i.e. interventions of various sorts) has not always produced equally good results, he emphasises that on numerous occasions, the United States has managed to build better infrastructure, provide better security and governance than locals had previously been able to. More importantly, according to Boot, the United States has always intervened with the best intentions.

Another prevailing idea, somewhat related to the ideals of Wilsonianism, is the humanitarian aspect of imperial power. Some, like Michael Ignatieff, argue very much in favour of using imperial power for humanitarian interventions and similar endeavours. This is also a highly idealistic conception of using imperialism, but it is perhaps a bit more pragmatic and realistic than pure Wilsonianism. In this vein, Ignatieff argues that some problems, humanitarian or otherwise, can only be solved by applying imperial power. However, he goes on to subscribe to a semi-Wilsonian notion of how empire can also be a necessary precondition for democracy in countries that are presently undemocratic. This complicates matters greatly, since it blurs the line somewhat between humanitarian intervention and Wilsonian intervention, so to speak. This begs the question of whether or not we consider the two interdependent rather than mutually exclusive. It would then be possible to see one as simply a natural extension of the other. This opens up even more questions over definitions, exposing deep problems with the marriage of imperialism and humanitarianism. Ignatieff sees the humanitarian potential as a case for ‘temporary empire’, thereby affirming that he does not support imperialism outright. On paper, this humanitarian aspect of imperialism looks very reasonable, but as we have seen, it can be difficult to determine the boundaries of a humanitarian mandate. Boot uses an example of a ‘small war’ gone wrong, to illustrate what he believes has become endemic for American interventions; that of getting involved with the best intentions of bringing peace, but end up getting drawn into a conflict. This is yet another slippery slope of interventions, humanitarian or otherwise, in that it is difficult to predict outcome as well as the course of an intervention.

A common complaint about the American empire and its military operations abroad, is that it does not primarily serve any of these aforementioned humanitarian or indeed Wilsonian principles. Rather, a host of critics, for instance Noam Chomsky, insist that overseas interventions and military presence is primarily conducted to protect and promote American commercial interests. As something of a proponent of American empire, Boot goes to great lengths to emphasise that the United States does not intervene or occupy territory solely for economic reasons, showing how American economic interests in, for instance, the Caribbean and Central American nations, is fairly limited. Countering Boot’s argument, Bacevich theorizes that the entire American foreign policy in recent years has been based on what he refers to as ‘openness’, that is, the constant search for access to new external markets. This search for markets, he claims, is basically driven by domestic political struggles within the United States itself. Ensuring the unhindered and constant economic growth for the American people is the all-important objective to gain leverage in this struggle. However, Bacevich does not believe that this economically driven foreign policy qualifies as imperialism in the classic sense, but that it is also rooted in the realization that trade is a better way to ensure global peace, than military conquest might be. Seen in this light, an American empire does not look too bad, but Bacevich makes an important note; that since the United States is primarily concerned with markets and threats to the stability and access to markets, it is very selective in when and where it intervenes. This means that intervention might only be conducted if market stability and access is at stake, not necessarily in any humanitarian crisis that presents itself. This means, as he also notes, that the high rhetoric of Wilsonianism amounts very little in the way of action, and essentially makes Ignatieff’s hope of an empire to take care of the world’s humanitarian problems look very doubtful indeed.

It is however difficult to be too critical of the United States in this regard. For sure, it appears the foreign policy is motivated by self-interest rather than high ideals, but it is difficult to see who else would be able to take on the job as global police force. As Robert Kagan eloquently notes, although for slightly different purposes, Europe has essentially been free riding for a number of years, counting on American defence spending to ensure security. In this light, while maybe not normatively satisfactory, it would at least make some pragmatic sense that the Americans would want some return for their extensive military spending and involvement abroad. Niall Ferguson sees the opportunity in this, of what he calls liberal imperialism. This kind of imperialism entails the free flow of goods, capital, labour and so on, and requires a reasonable degree of international order and peace in order to fully function. Therefore, Ferguson believes that this sort of liberal American empire is perfectly suited to ensure benefits for all people, not only Americans.

So to sum up, there are many ways, in theory at least, in which the American empire might prove to be constructively good, such as for conducting humanitarian operations as well as for providing global peace and prosperity. On the other hand, the very nature of an empire means that the empire is able to impose its will on many other nations; an ability that is easy to exploit and difficult to counter. This also means that even if the empire is acting in a manner of blatant self-interest, it is difficult to hold it accountable.

In the next post, I will look closer at the more military aspects of the American global presence and how the role as the only superpower in the world is retained.


Works referred to here:

Andrew Bacevich: American Empire
Max Boot: The Savage Wars of Peace
Noam Chomsky: Hegemony or Survival
Niall Ferguson: Colossus
Michael Ignatieff: Empire Lite
Robert Kagan: Power and Weakness

Introducing the American Empire

Welcome to my small project on the American empire.
This project is intended to be a brief introduction into several aspects of the nature and also future of the American empire. This introduction will span several posts over the next month, which will each involve considerations about aspects of the empire.

This first post will be a sort of general introduction, both in terms of the subject as a whole, and the nature of the American empire. While much literature and discussion has been devoted to the question of whether the global American presence and power constitutes an empire or not, I have approached this by accepting the existence of an American empire as predetermined assumption. While I certainly recognize that this open to argumentation, it might be more useful to approach the way in which American power is projected around the world, as a form of empire, rather than getting bogged down in a discussion of semantics. In any case, there are plenty of writers who recognize the reality of an empire, both in terms of supporters and critics. In my series of posts, I will be drawing on some of these writers.

Once the premise of the American empire is accepted, the next logical question that necessarily emerges is of course what kind of empire it is, and how to define it. Insofar as the classical notion of an empire is perhaps defined by a never-ending quest for more territory, the American empire does not appear to fit to that description. Rather, as is often emphasised by opponents of the whole concept of an American empire, as well as by those generally in favour of an interventionist foreign policy, the quest for territory is not a driving force for the United States. Niall Ferguson believes that it is a common misconception to equate an empire with a form of direct rule over a body of subjects, which might also be considered the classical definition. He highlights the usefulness in operating in more flexible terms, such as the distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ rule, and ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ empire. Following this logic, it is possible to be an empire even without physically subjugating nations or peoples. Andrew Bacevich notes that while the United States tried their hands on obtaining a traditional empire in the past, it was abandoned in favour of a more cost-effective model. Indeed he believes that one of the reasons for the lack of colonial ambition, at least in the past, is that it was simply a poor investment to get involved in ‘direct’ rule.
Max Boot comprehensively argues that the United States has certainly been involved in its fair share of empire-like endeavours and interventions in the past, in his detailed historical accounts of what he refers to as ‘small wars’. He also underlines that mostly, though with some notable exceptions, the United States would only retain a military presence for as long as it took to resolve a given conflict, and then quickly get out. This certainly backs the notion that America has little or no imperially territorial ambitions, but at the same time, it reinforces the image, both historically and contemporarily, of a nation that is not afraid to conduct interventions. Boot consequently notes that the American reluctance for overseas colonialism does not equate an isolationist policy, which is an important point if one is to understand the current American empire.

As Boot and others note, this particular feature of the United States foreign policy underlines the particular paradox of the American empire; that it was originally founded on an idea, whether real or perceived, of anti-imperialism. This adds to the notion of the ‘reluctant’ empire, that is, an empire that does not actively seek out expansion or colonies, something that coincides very well with our previous assumption of lack of territorial ambition. However, while the ‘reluctant’ empire has a nice, almost apologetic ring to it, it is not a view that is universally shared. Andrew Bacevich notes that the myth of reluctance is very much an idealized (American) way of portraying reality, perhaps in order to justify the numerous interventions and general involvement in world affairs. However, no one can dispute that the might of the American military would, technically at least, be more than capable of conquering vast areas if it was so inclined. But the fact that the United States chooses not to, makes the American empire quite different from the territorially driven empires of old.

From these points we can so far deduce that while the American empire is perhaps not an empire in the classical sense, it does feature certain empire-like qualities, especially in terms of sheer military power and willingness to use that power, albeit not for ‘traditional’ imperial utility. With these conclusions in place, we can turn to examining how exactly its imperial power manifests itself, and to what exactly motivates American policy makers. For the next couple of weeks I will look closer at the imperial strategy, both politically and militarily, as well as the economic considerations.

Works referred to here:

Andrew Bacevich: American Empire
Max Boot: The Savage Wars of Peace
Niall Ferguson: Colossus